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Kentucky Taxation
BY FREDERICK W. WHITESIDE* and JOHN R. HARMAN**
The most significant changes in the Kentucky tax law last
year involved inheritance, sales, and income taxes. As can be
expected in a legislative year, the impact of new legislation
overshadowed the developments resulting from judicial deci-
sions. The primary changes were in income, inheritance, sales
and use, and coal severance taxation.
I. INCOME TAX LEGISLATION
The General Assembly long ago adopted a policy of using
the federal income tax system "as nearly as practicable"' as a
guide for the calculation of income and deductions for the Ken-
tucky individual income tax. Despite this announced policy,
many differences have arisen over the years. The need for much
closer conformity of the state law with the federal has been
urged in previous articles on the grounds that it would reduce
the difficulty and expense of compliance by individual taxpay-
ers and increase its efficiency.' However, keeping Kentucky
income tax law abreast of the everchanging federal Internal
Revenue Code requires updating the Kentucky statutes at each
legislative session to incorporate the increasing volume of fed-
eral code amendments enacted since the previous General As-
sembly. These efforts are plagued with problems of obtaining
support for revisions of the Kentucky statutes and a constant
time lag.
A. Dependent Care Deduction
An example of the problem of catching up with the federal
* Professor of Law (Emeritus 1978), University of Kentucky. B.A. 1933, Univer-
sity of Arkansas; LL.B. 1936, Cornell University; of counsel to the firm of Smith
and Bowling, Lexington, Kentucky.
** J.D. 1979, University of Kentucky.
Ky. REv. STAT. § 141.050(11) (1970) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
Whiteside and Moss, Amending Kentucky's Individual Income Tax Law, 38 Ky.
B. J. 48 (1974); Whiteside and Moss, Federal-State Income Tax Relationships-
Conformity of Kentucky's Personal Income Tax With the Federal Model, 61 Ky. L.J.
462 (1973).
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changes arose in 1978, along with additional problems of varia-
tion from the federal model, in connection with the income tax
benefit allowed working persons for the care of dependents.
Kentucky Revised Statutes § 141.010(11) authorizes the tax-
payer to deduct from adjusted gross income all deductions
"allowed individuals by Chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue
Code." 3 However, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 repealed the
dependent care deduction4 and substituted an income tax
credit.5 This repeal of the federal deduction left Kentucky
without any tax benefit for the care of children of working
taxpayers. Instead of following the recent federal shift from
deductions to credits, the 1978 General Assembly re-enacted
the old federal deduction from gross income allowed "by Sec-
tion 214 of the Internal Revenue Code as it existed on Decem-
ber 31, 1975."6
The requirements to qualify for the full deduction are:
(1) Only those dependent care expenses which "are incurred
to enable the taxpayer to be gainfully employed"7 are deduct-
ible.
(2) The household must contain a dependent or spouse who
is incapable of caring for himself or a child under fifteen who
either is a student or earns less than $750 per year.'
(3) The taxpayer and his spouse must furnish more than one-
half the cost of maintaining the household.'
(4) If the taxpayer and his wife jointly earn over $35,000 per
year, the deduction will be reduced by one-half the income
exceeding $35,000 per year. The reduction, however, is calcu-
lated on a monthly basis so that the reduction for each month
depends upon the excess over an annual income of $35,000
KRS § 141.010(11) (1970) (amended 1978).
1 I.R.C. § 214 (repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 504
(b)(i), 90 Stat. 1565).
- Act of Oct. 4, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 504(b)(i), 90 Stat. 1565 (repealing
I.R.C. § 214).
1 KRS § 104.010(11) (Supp. 1978).
7 I.R.C. § 214(b)(2) (repealed 1976).
8 Compare I.R.C. § 214(b)(2) (repealed 1976), which provided for the deduction
of some costs of caring for dependents and spouses who are incapable of caring for
themselves and which provided for deduction of some costs of caring for children under
nineteen who are qualified under I.R.C. § 151(e), with I.R.C. § 151(e), which provides
that children who earn less than $750.00 per year or who are students are qualified.
I I.R.C. § 214(b)(3) (repealed 1976).
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which is attributable to that month.'0
(5) If the dependent care expenses are for services rendered
outside the home, the deduction is limited to $200 per month
for one dependent and $300 per month for two dependents
and $400 per month for three or more dependents."
B. Casualty Loss Deduction
Until 1978, casualty and disaster losses were deductible
only under KRS § 141.010 (11), which authorizes the taxpayer
to deduct all items that are deductible on the federal return.' 2
In 1978 the General Assembly enacted KRS § 141.011, a sepa-
rate provision allowing the deduction of casualty and disaster
losses. As under the prior law, casualty losses will normally be
deductible only in the year they are incurred, 3 except that the
loss can be deducted in the year preceding the occurrence if the
President of the United States determines that the disaster
warrants assistance under the Disaster Relief Act. 4 KRS §
141.011 modifies the previous provision by empowering the tax-
payer to carry forward all casualty losses which are in excess
of the current year's income regardless of Presidential Declara-
tion. It also authorizes the taxpayer to carry over deductions
to succeeding years whenever the casualty or disaster losses
exceed income in the year they are first deductible. 5 Thus the
ability to obtain some tax benefit to offset a casualty loss will
no longer depend on the fortuitous circumstances of whether
the taxpayer has sufficient income in the year of the loss.
II. INHER1TANCE TAX
The most important action of the General Assembly af-
fecting inheritance taxes is the relief provided by a substantial
I.R.C. § 214(d) (repealed 1976).
" I.R.C. § 214(c)(2) (repealed 1976).
12 KRS § 141.010(11) (1970) (amended 1978) allows deduction on the state income
tax return of those deductions allowed on the federal return by chapter 1 of the Internal
Revenue Code which have not been specifically excluded by a state provision. I.R.C.
§ 165, which authorizes taxpayer deductions of casualty and disaster losses, is such a
deducton.
23 The prior law was I.R.C. § 165(c)(3), adopted pursuant to KRS § 141.010(11)
(1970).




increase in the exemption allowed a surviving spouse, minor
child, or incompetent adult. The exemption for property pass-
ing to a surviving spouse of a decedent dying after July 1, 1978,
is $50,000 (in lieu of the former $20,000) and the exemption for
property passing to a minor child or incompetent adult child
is raised from $10,000 to $20,000.11 The rates and the tax brack-
ets for each rate remain unchanged. The seemingly generous
increase in the exemption amounts, however, is somewhat illu-
sory. It will not yield a commensurate decrease in inheritance
taxes for larger estates because the exemption is first applied
to property which would have fallen in the lower rate brack-
ets. 17 For example, if $150,000 passes to a surviving spouse, the
$50,000 exemption will be applied against property which falls
within the two to five percent rates, while the remaining
$100,000 will be subjected to the five percent rates.
A. Special Valuation of Agricultural Property
A new provision, effective July 1, 1978, permits valuation
of certain property at its agricultural or horticultural value
rather than the fair market value of the property in its best
use." This provision is similar to section 2032A of the Internal
Revenue Code in that it gives preferential tax treatment to
agricultural property descending to a family member who con-
tinues to operate the farm for five years after the decedent's
death. 9
To qualify for special valuation the "fair cash value" of the
property must exceed fifty percent of the decedent's gross taxa-
ble estate0 and the property must have been operated as a farm
for five continuous years prior to the owner's death.2 The prop-
, KRS § 140.080(1) (Supp. 1978).
" The new statutory language provides that the exemptions shall be "chargeable
against the lowest bracket or brackets of inheritable interests," KRS § 140.080(1)
(Supp. 1978) (emphasis added). Thus the tax is applied to the higher progressive rates.
This change from previous law was intended by the 1978 General Assembly when it
enacted Chapter 38 of Kentucky Acts, 1978. See also Instructions to the Inheritance
and Estate Tax (Form 92A120(1), 7-78), p. 8, as applied to decedents dying after July
1, 1978.
" KRS § 140.310 (Supp. 1978).
, KRS § 140.300 (Supp. 1978).
2 KRS § 140.300(4)(c) (Supp. 1978).
21 KRS § 140.300(4)(b) (Supp. 1978).
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erty must be used for agricultural or horticultural purposes and
must either have produced a statutorily specified minimum
income during three of the five years prior to death or there
must be evidence that it will produce that minimum income
in the future. 22 Finally the farm must descend to a spouse,
child, or child's spouse2 and the tract must be at least five to
ten acres depending on what it produces.4
The property's fair market value as well as its agricultural
value must be reported when the inheritance tax return is
filed. 25 In no case can the special valuation reduce the gross
estate by more than $500,000.26 The following chart demon-
strates the effect of the new provision on the gross taxable
estate.
Estate X Estate Y
FMV of Gross estate 2,000,000 2,000,000
Fair Cash Value of Farm 998,000 1,002,000
Fair Cash Value of Farm
as a percentage of gross estate 49.9% 50.1%
Agricultural Value of Farm 500,000 500,000
Fair Cash Value less
agricultural value 498,000 502,000
Reduction in Gross Taxable estate
due to special valuation 0* 500,000**
* Estate X did not qualify because the fair cash value of the farm did
not exceed 50% of the gross taxable estate.
** The reduction in the gross taxable estate is less than the difference
between FMV and agricultural value of the farm in estate Y because
the special valuation cannot be used to reduce the gross estate by
more than $500,000.
22 To qualify, the property must be agricultural or horticultural land. KRS §
140.300(4)(a) (Supp. 1978). Horticultural land is:
any tract of land, including all income producing improvements but
excluding all residences, of at least five (5) contiguous acres in area commer-
cially used for the cultivation of a garden, orchard, or the raising of fruits or
nuts, vegetables, flowers or ornamental plants, where such activities pro-
duced an average annual gross income
which varies with the size of the farm. KRS § 132.010(8) (Supp. 1978). Agricultural
land is defined as a ten-acre or larger tract "used for the production of livestock,
livestock products, poultry, poultry products and/or the growing of tobacco and/or
other crops including timber" or where qualifying under federal or state agricultural
programs and provided the property produces a minimum average income which varies
with the size of the farm. KRS § 132.010(7) (Supp. 1978).
21 KRS § 140.300(5) (Supp. 1978).
24 KRS § 132.010(7)-(8) (Supp. 1978). It requires that horticultural property be at
least five acres and that agricultural property be at least ten acres.
u' KRS § 140.340 (Supp. 1978).
21 KRS § 140.360 (Supp. 1978).
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Where qualified real estate has been assessed at its farm
value for the ad valorem tax, that valuation will be presumed
valid for the inheritance tax. Otherwise, the assessment proce-
dure outlined in KRS § 132.450 for the ad valorem valuation
will be used.Y
If within five years of the owner's death the farm is trans-
ferred to other than a qualified family member or is converted
to a non-farming use, the qualified person who took the prop-
erty at death must pay the additional tax that would have been
due on the estate if the farm had been assessed at its fair
market value in its best use.? In the event that the person to
whom the estate passed does not pay, the new act provides for
a lien against the farm out of which the additional taxes can
be collected. 9
The Kentucky provision allowing special valuation is sim-
pler and in several ways much more restrictive than section
2032A of the Internal Revenue Code. There are four major dif-
ferences between the two provisions. First, although both pro-
visions allow special valuation of property which makes up fifty
percent or more of the gross estate,"0 the federal provision al-
lows for special valuation of property if it constitutes at least
twenty-five percent of the gross estate and if the decedent or a
member of his family materially participated in the operation
of the property." Second, the federal provision permits special
valuation of any property used in a trade or business at its
value in that business,3 2 while the Kentucky provision applies
only to agricultural or horticultural property.? Third, KRS §
140.300 allows special valuation only if the property passes to
a spouse, child, or a spouse of a child. Under the federal provi-
sion the qualified heirs may come from a larger group consist-
ing of an "individual's ancestor or lineal descendent, a lineal
KRS § 140.330 (Supp. 1978).
" KRS § 140.320 (Supp. 1978). The unpaid tax is also subject to an interest charge
of eight percent per year.
2 KRS § 140.350 (Supp. 1978).
-, I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(1)(A); KRS § 140.300(3)(c) (Supp. 1978).
1, I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(1) (B)-(C) provides that a family member must have materi-
ally participated in farm operations during five of the eight years preceding the owner's
death.
32 I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(2).
3 KRS § 140.310 (Supp. 1978).
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descendent of a grandparent of such individual, the spouse of
such individual, or the spouse of any such individual, or the
spouse of any such descendant.""4 Finally, I.R.C. § 2032A(c)
provides for penalties if the property's use is changed or if it is
sold to a non-qualified heir within fifteen years after death. The
more liberal Kentucky provision restricts the sale and use of
the property for only five years."
B. Deferral Provisions
The 1978 General Assembly added two new inheritance
tax deferral provisions. The first allows certain class A benefici-
aries" receiving a farm or other closely held business to pay the
tax in five annual installments. To qualify, the beneficiary's
inheritance tax burden must exceed $5,000, and the farm or
closely held business must account for at least seventy-five
percent of his distributive share.3" While payments are out-
standing the farm or closely held business will be subject to a
lien." Upon sale of the farm or business the deferred install-
ments will immediately become payable.39 The General Assem-
bly also adopted a ten-year deferral provision." The ten-year
deferral is available to any beneficiary whose inheritance tax
burden is greater than $5,0001 regardless of the type of prop-
erty he receives. Under the ten-year provision, none of the
property received by the beneficiary is subject to a lien42 and
the beneficiary can relieve himself of the burden of paying
interest by paying the installments early. Because the ten-year
provision is much more lenient, the five year provision is rela-
tively useless. Under either provision the beneficiary must file
1 I.R.C. § 2032A(e).
" KRS § 140.300(5) (Supp. 1978).
m Class A beneficiaries include the transferor's "parent, surviving spouse, child
by blood, stepchild, child adopted during infancy or a grandchild who is the issue of a
child by blood, of a stepchild or a child adopted during infancy." KRS § 140.070 (1970).
" KRS § 140.151 (Supp. 1978).
u KRS § 140.151(6) (Supp. 1978).
31 KRS § 140.151(1)(c) (Supp. 1978).
" KRS § 140.222 (Supp. 1978).
41 KRS § 140.222(1) (Supp. 1978).
12 While a beneficiary electing to defer his tax under KRS § 140.222 is personally
liable for the tax, there is no provision for creating a lien. KRS § 140.222(4) (Supp.
1978).
1978-79]
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an election in writing3 and pay the first installment when the
return is filed.4 The interest rate under both provisions is eight
percent of the unpaid balance. 45 Deferral under either provision
releases the personal representative, trustee, or estate from lia-
bility on the deferred payments. 4'
C. Large Estates
KRS § 140.065, which exempted estates of over $3 million
from the inheritance tax, was repealed by the 1978 General
Assembly. 7 Henceforth all estates will be subject to both the
estate tax and the inheritance tax. Because the Kentucky es-
tate tax is equal to the difference between the state inheritance
tax and the maximum state death tax credit allowable against
federal estate taxes under I.R.C. § 2011,41 the Kentucky estate
tax never imposed any additional burden. Any state estate tax
payable would be offset by a like credit against federal estate
taxes.4" In some instances the federal tax credit which deter-
mines the amount of the estate tax is less than the Kentucky
inheritance tax. Since the prior law exempted large estates
from inheritance tax, net taxes paid by estates over $3 million
could be less than the taxes paid by those under $3 million, as
illustrated by the following examples:
Prior Law Present Law Prior Law Present Law
Taxable Estate ......... 2,999,000 2,999,000 3,000,000 3,000,000
Inheritance Tax
assuming everything
goes to class C
beneficiaries* ...... 466,910 466,910 0 466,910
Estate Tax ............ 0 230,280 0
* computed under KRS § 140.070 with $500 exemption under KRS § 140.080(5)(e).
"3 KRS § 140.222(3) (Supp. 1978); KRS § 140.151(5) (Supp. 1978).
" KRS § 140.222(1) (Supp. 1978); KRS § 140.151(1) (Supp. 1978).
,' KRS § 140.222(2) (Supp. 1978); KRS § 140.151(4) (Supp. 1978).
' KRS § 140.222(3) (Supp. 1978); KRS § 140.151(5) (Supp. 1978).
'7 1978 Ky. AcrS ch. 233, § 6.
48 KRS § 140.130(1) (1970). "In addition to the inheritance tax ... an estate tax
is. . ., levied on all estates equal to the amount by which the credits for state death
taxes allowable under the federal tax law exceeds the tax levied under KRS 140.010,
less the discount allowed under KRS 140.210, if taken by the taxpayer."
Apparently the federal credit was adopted to reduce the discrepancy between the
various states' death taxes. I.R.C. § 2011 reduces a state's ability to advertize itself as
a tax haven and thus eliminates one factor which may cause the elderly to relocate.
" I.R.C. § 2011 provides that within certain specified limits "[tihe tax imposed
by section 2001 [the federal estate tax] shall be credited with the amount of any
estate, inheritance, legacy, or succession taxes actually paid to any State."
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As the above table illustrates, it would sometimes be to an
estate's advantage under the pre-1978 law to inflate valuations
or deflate deductions.
D. Certificates of Deposit
A decedent's fractional interest in a certificate of deposit
held jointly with a right of survivorship is taxed under KRS §
140.050.5 Until 1978, a surviving joint owner's interest in the
certificate was also subject to estate and inheritance taxes if it
was received as a gift from a decedent within three years of the
decedent's death. All such transfers are presumed to be made
in contemplation of death" and thus are taxable." During 1978,
the General Assembly enacted KRS § 140.020(3) eliminating
the contemplation of death presumption for jointly held certifi-
cates of deposits,53 thereby eliminating the tax on a large num-
ber of lifetime transfers. This curious new provision changes
the law only with respect to the portion of the certificate of
deposit the decedent contributed in excess of his fractional
interest and for which he received no consideration.
This revision is reasonable in light of the delays and bur-
dens the old provision placed on the banks. Banks are prohib-
ited from paying certificates of deposit without either
"retaining a sufficient portion thereof to pay any (inheritance)
tax"54 or obtaining a waiver from the Department of Revenue."
' KRS § 140.050 provides that when any property is held jointly with right of
survivorship the decedent's fractional interest in the property is taxed as if it had been
owned by the decedent at death and bequeathed to the surviving joint owner.
51 KRS § 140.020(1) (1970).
52 KRS § 140.020(2) (1970). This provision is best understood in light of the devel-
oping differences between the federal "uniform transfer tax" system and the Kentucky
inheritance tax. Because Kentucky has no gift tax, intervivos gifts will act to reduce
the size of the estate inherited or bequeathed and thus reduce the inheritance taxes
paid. To eliminate the use of gifts as a tax avoidance scheme, Kentucky adopted KRS
§ 140.020, which is similar to the pre-1977 federal law. Although the Kentucky provi-
sion has basically remained the same, the federal provision was changed to eliminate
the contemplation of death provision for transfers made after January 1, 1977. Act of
Oct. 4, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 200(a)(5), 90 Stat. 1848 (amending I.R.C. § 2035).
The new federal provision brings back into the gross estate all transfers made within
three years of death. I.R.C. § 2035.
KRS § 140.020(3) (Supp. 1978).
KRS § 140.250(3) (Supp. 1978).
"Id.; see Op. Ky. Arr'Y GEN. 76-501 (1976) for authority that KRS § 140.250(3)
is unchanged by KRS §§ 391.315(1), .355 (Supp. 1978). KRS § 391.315(1) provides that
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By removing the presumption that the decedent's excess con-
tribution to those jointly-held certificates of deposit was in
contemplation of death, the legislature has shifted the burden
of proof to the Department of Revenue. Because the likelihood
that inheritance taxes will be payable on more than the dece-
dent's interest has been greatly reduced, the risk that banks
will not have withheld enough is reduced. Consequently, their
responsibility to investigate the source of funding for all the
interests in a jointly-held certificate of deposit is greatly
lessened.
The new provision is also important for effective tax plan-
ning. This is the only type of gift that can be made within three
years of death that will relieve the heirs from the burden of
proving that it was not made in contemplation of death. Since
the burden of proof can be almost insurmountable,56 elderly
persons and persons in poor health may best be advised to
make gifts in the form of a joint interest in a certificate of
deposit. Although the interest will be taxable if the Depart-
ment of Revenue proves that the gift was made in contempla-
tion of death, the likelihood of taxability is less than with any
other form of gift.
II. SALES AND USE TAX
The major developments in Kentucky's sales and use tax
were the addition of three exemptions and the Supreme Court's
clarification of the exemption for new manufacturing equip-
ment.
A. Machinery for New and Expanded Use
KRS § 139.480(8) exempts from the sales and use tax the
sale of manufacturing and processing machinery for use in new
"[slums remaining on deposit at the death of a party to a joint account belong to the
surviving party or parties as against the estate of the decedent unless there is clear
and convincing evidence of a different intention at the time the account is created."
KRS § 391.335 provides that "[a]ny sums in a joint account may be paid, on request,
to any party without regard to whether any other party is incapacitated or deceased
at the time the payment is demanded."
" See Chase's Ex'r v. Commonwealth, 145 S.W.2d 58 (Ky. 1940), where the bur-




and expanded industry. The most important qualification for
the exemption is that the machinery be "used directly in the
manufacturing or processing production process."57 In two re-
cent cases the Kentucky Supreme Court clarified this concept.
In Commonwealth v. Kuhlman Corporation,5" the Court ex-
plored the difference between equipment incorporated directly
in the manufacturing process and that which performs supervi-
sory or managerial functions. There the taxpayer installed a
modem system of tracking the progress of jobs through its man-
ufacturing plant and claimed a sales tax exemption for part of
the system-a small computer located in a room separate from
the manufacturing machinery. The computer's only link to the
manufacturing process was by way of computer cards filled out
by the workers. As these cards progressed with the various
projects through the plant's manufacturing stages the workers
would note on the cards when each stage was completed. At'the
end of each day the cards were collected and run through the
computer. 9
Because the computer was so divorced from the manufac-
turing process it was unnecessary for the Court to determine
which factors it will rely on in deciding whether machinery is
used directly in manufacturing. Thus in holding that the com-
puter was not "machinery used directly in the manufacturing
process""0 the Court did not set out a clear test. Instead it
simply noted that the computer did not control any manufac-
turing machinery nor did it manufacture anything itself."
The second case, Ross v. Greene & Webb Lumber
Company, 12 dealt with the question of when the manufacturing
process begins and ends. In Ross, the Greene and Webb Lum-
ber Company had been denied an exemption by the Depart-
ment of Revenue for the purchase of forklifts. The forklifts were
used both to carry lumber to a conveyor which carried the logs
to their first milling process and to stack the logs after they
were milled." In holding that the equipment was directly in-
s, KRS § 139.170 (Supp. 1978) (emphasis added).
564 S.W.2d 14 (Ky. 1978).
" Commonwealth v. Kuhlman Corp., 564 S.W.2d 14, 15-16 (Ky. 1978).
"Id. at 15-16.
" Id. at 16.
62 567 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. 1978).
93 Ross v. Greene and Webb Lumber Co., 559 S.W.2d 163 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977),
1978-79]
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volved in manufacturing the Court defined the parameters of
the manufacturing process:
To conform to the legislative intent the manufacturing
process should begin when the raw material (logs here) starts
moving in a chain of unbroken, integrated sequence into the
plant or mill and ends with a generally accepted saleable
product. The machinery necessary and exclusively used in
this chain should make up the machinery used directly in the
manufacturing process."
The Court's use of the words "exclusively" and
"necessary" in the last sentence is dictum since no machinery
was denied the sales tax exclusion because of those require-
ments. They are factors which have not previously been re-
quired for the new machinery sales tax exclusion. If the require-
ment that the machinery be exclusively used and necessary to
the manufacturing process is taken literally by the Department
of Revenue, it will be at least as important an addition to the
Kentucky sales tax law as the test which hinges the tax upon
where the manufacturing process will be considered to have
begun and ended.
In a third case, Department of Revenue v. Allied Drum
Service, Inc. 5 the Supreme Court of Kentucky expanded the
scope of what constitutes manufacturing for purposes of the
sales tax exemption of machinery purchased for a new or ex-
panded industry. Because the General Assembly extended the
machinery exemption to include all processing equipment
rather than just equipment used in the manufacturing pro-
cess,6" the holding in Allied Drum Service, Inc. will only affect
the exemption of purchases made before December 22, 1976.
Allied Drum was in the business of acquiring relatively
worthless used metal drums and cleaning, reshaping, resealing
and painting them. 7 Exemption of the machinery turned on
aff'd, 567 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. 1978). The exemption of 13 other pieces of equipment was
also contested by the Department of Revenue. These included a waste burner and
conveyors used to carry waste to the burner, as well as others. Id. at 164-65. The
Supreme Court of Kentucky held that "[a]ll the items are . . . exempt as being
'directly used in the manufacturing process."' 567 S.W.2d at 304.
64 Id. (quoting the trial court).
561 S.W.2d 323 (Ky. 1978).
66 1976 (Extra. Session) Ky. Acts ch. 7, § 1 (amending KRS § 139.170 (1970)).
561 S.W.2d at 324.
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whether these activities constituted manufacturing. The De-
partment of Revenue contended that because the process
began with a drum and ended with a drum nothing was manu-
factured. Although the former Court of Appeals had used the
same rationale in denying the exemption in several earlier
cases" the Kentucky Supreme Court allowed the exclusion of
the purchase price of Allied Drum's processing equipment. In
doing so, the Court redefined manufacturing to constitute
those processes whereby "[m]aterial having no commercial
value for its intended use before processing has appreciable
commercial value for its intended use after processing by the
machinery."'"
B. Soybean and Grain Farming Equipment
The 1978 General Assembly exempted the sale of any facil-
ity used on the farm in grain or soybean production from the
sales and use tax.7 This newly enacted provision applies to the
purchase of replacement and repair parts as well as the pur-
chase of the original facility. The preferred treatment is given
to facilities used exclusively in the "storing, drying, processing,
or handling"71 of grain or soybeans. The wording of the exemp-
tion leaves unresolved the question of what kind of processing
equipment can be installed on the farm property and be enti-
tled to the exemption. Surely bakery equipment installed on
the farm will not be exempt as on-farm processing equipment.
This issue can probably best be resolved by restrictively inter-
preting the requirement that the facility must be an "on-farm
facility." 72 The exemption should only apply to equipment used
in ordinary farming operations. Equipment used for what is
really a manufacturing or refining process should be considered
off the farming premises and thus not exempt.
" In Prestonsburg Water Co. v. Prestonsburg Bd. of Suppliers, 131 S.W.2d 451,
453 (Ky. 1939), the Court of Appeals denied exemption of a water filtration system
because the process began and ended with water and thus nothing was manufactured.
Similarly, in City of Louisville v. Ewing Von-Allman Dairy Co., 105 S.W.2d 801, 803-
4 (Ky. 1937), the Court of Appeals refused to exempt a milk pasteurizer.
1' Dep't of Revenue v. Allied Drum Service, Inc., 561 S.W.2d 323, 325-26 (Ky.
1978).





C. Energy Producing Fuels
The 1978 General Assembly added a provision to exempt
from the sales and use tax the sale of fuels used by agricultural
machinery. 73 The exemption applies only to fuels used to
"operate or propel"" tractors or farm equipment. Fuels used for
lighting and heating farm facilities are not exempt. The ex-
emption does not include wood or coal used to propel a steam
engine but includes just about every other fuel.75
In addition, the General Assembly clarified an existing
fuel exemption. KRS § 139.480(3) exempts from the sales tax
those fuels used in "manufacturing, processing, mining, or re-
fining" to the extent that the cost of the fuels exceeds three
percent of the total cost of production. The old statute did not
specify whether the total cost of production should be com-
puted on the basis of each type of machine, each plant, or a
series of processes performed at perhaps different plants but,
when all combined, yield one identifiable product. Obviously
a multi-process or multi-plant manufacturing concern's ex-
emption would differ depending on the computation method
used. This situation was clarified by adding to the exemption
provision the requirement that the "[c]ost of production shall
be computed on the basis of plant facilities which shall mean
all permanent structures affixed to real property at one (1)
location." 8
- KRS § 139.480(13) (Supp. 1978).
7Id.
,5 KRS § 139.480(13) provides that "[g]asoline, special fuels, and liquified petro-
leum gas" are excludable fuels. KRS § 138.210(4) (1971) defines gasoline to include:
all liquid fuels, including liquids ordinarily, practically and commercially
usable in internal combustion engines for the generation of power, and all
distillates of and condensates from petroleum, natural gas, coal, coal tar,
vegetable ferments and all other products so usable except propane, butane
or other liquified petroleum gases, kerosene, cleaner solvent, fuel oil, diesel
fuel and crude oil.
KRS § 234.100 provides that 'liquified petroleum gas' means and includes any mate-
rial which is composed predominantly of any of the following hydrocarbons, or mix-
tures of them, whether in the liquid or in the gaseous states: propane, propylene,
butane (normal butane or isobutane), and butylene." Special fuels include "all com-
bustible gases and liquids capable of being used for the generation of power in an
internal combustion engine to propel vehicles of any kind upon the public highways,
except. . .gasoline . .. and liquified petroleum gas." KRS § 138.560(3) (1970).




Section 170 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that a
non-profit educational institution's property cannot be taxed."
The Department of Revenue interprets this constitutional ex-
emption to apply to a tax on the sale of property by the institu-
tion as well.78 Thus the Department of Revenue has taken the
position that the sale of textbooks by a non-profit school is
exempt from the sales tax.79 In 1970 the General Assembly
enacted KRS § 139.474 to equalize the competitive positions of
state-owned university bookstores and private textbook sell-
ers.80 It provided that state-owned university bookstores com-
peting with privately operated college bookstores would be sub-
ject to the sales tax. Because the provision calling for taxation
of sales by non-profit educational institutions directly con-
flicted with the Department of Revenue's interpretation of the
Kentucky Constitution, the provision was repealed.81 In 1978
the General Assembly adopted another approach to eliminat-
ing the competitive disadvantage. Instead of requiring taxation
of sales by educational institutions, the new provision, KRS §
139.480(14), equalizes the tax treatment of the two types of
bookstores by exempting both from the sales tax. The exemp-
tion, however, is limited to the sale of textbooks and other
materials required for a course at a non-profit educational in-
stitution." The sale of any item which is not specifically re-
quired of all students for a particular course, including
"notebooks, paper, pencils, calculators, tape recorders, or other
similar student aids"' is not exempt.
7 "There shall be exempt from taxation. . ., institutions of education not used
or employed for gain by any person or corporation, and the income of which is devoted
solely to the cause of education." Ky. CONST. § 170.
11 Ky. ADMIm. REG. SERV. SU-2(b) (1974).
7g See Kennedy Book Store, Inc. v; Dept. of Revenue, 450 S.W.2d 524, 526 (Ky.
1970) (holding that the Department of Revenue's position was not arbitrary or uncon-
stitutionally discriminatory). The Department of Revenue has also not taxed the sale
of textbooks by distributors to schools even though KRS § 139.200 imposes-the tax on
the buyer and not the seller. Department of Revenue v. Kentucky Textbook, Inc., 555
S.W.2d 573, 574 (Ky. 1977). This may be because the transaction is not considered a
"retail sale" for purposes of KRS § 139.100 or because the sale is expressly exempted
by KRS § 139.470.
, 1970 Ky. AcTS ch. 275, § 1.
81 1978 Ky. AcTs ch. 258, § 3.





In addition to making numerous procedural changes, the
1978 General Assembly enacted a one and one-half cent per
hundred dollars ad valorem tax on privately owned leasehold
interests in government buildings.84 The leasehold interest is
taxable by the state but explicitly exempt from county and
other local taxing authorities."
V. COAL SEVERANCE TAX
The coal severance tax is now imposed not only on the
value of coal at its extraction, but also upon its value as in-
creased by post-severance processing. 8 Processing includes
"cleaning, breaking, sizing, dust allaying, treating to prevent
freezing, or loading for shipment."" However, merely loading
coal which has not otherwise been treated in Kentucky is not
a taxable process.88
The severance tax is imposed on the party with an eco-
nomic interest in the coal.89 Therefore, a party who merely
contracts to process the coal but who has no ownership interest
in the coal is not taxed. Instead the tax is placed on the owner
who hired the processor."0 The tax is levied on the difference
between what a taxable processor received for the processed
coal and what he paid for it.' The 4.5% tax rate is the same as
that levied on the extraction of coal, except that the minimum
tax of fifty cents per ton is not imposed on taxpayers who
merely process coal. 2
- KRS § 132.020(1) (Supp. 1978) (effective Jan. 1, 1979).
u KRS § 132.200(8) (Supp. 1978).
" KRS § 143.020 (Supp. 1978).
- KRS § 143.010(8) (Supp. 1978).
" Id.
9, KRS § 143.010(5) (Supp. 1978). Economic interest is defined to be:
synonymous with the economic interest ownership required by Internal Rev-
enue Code section 611 in effect on December 31, 1977, entitling the taxpayer
to a depletion deduction for income tax purposes with the exception that a
party who only receives an arm's length royalty shall not be considered as
having an economic interest.
KRS § 143.010(10) (Supp. 1978).
" KRS § 143.010(5) (Supp. 1978).
KRS § 143.010(6)(b)(2)(e) (Supp. 1978).
"KRS § 143.020 (Supp. 1978).
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VI. UNIFORM GIrS TO MINORS AcT
Kentucky's Uniform Gifts to Minors Act" provides a sim-
plified procedure for giving income producing property to
minor children. As a consequence, its enactment made income
splitting'4 with minor children more convenient. A significant
improvement in the mechanics of making such gifts was ac-
complished by the 1978 legislature with the enactment of KRS
§ 385.120, which permits testamentary bequests to a named
custodian for the minor child. The new provision allows the
transfer of the same kinds of property which the donor could
have given during his lifetime." The effects of such bequests
are the same as with intervivos transfers, except for the neces-
sity of passing through probate.
The 1978 General Assembly also acted to resolve an ambi-
guity in the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act. In 1976, the legisla-
ture redefined "minor"" as a person under eighteen, yet failed
to change KRS § 385.041(4), which set twenty-one as the age
when a custodian must turn the property over to a minor. This
created an ambiguity as to when gifts must be turned over to
a minor. 7 The principal reason for not changing the statutory
age at which the property must be turned over to the donee was
that many gifts had been made in contemplation of the donee
receiving them at age twenty-one. Nevertheless, the 1978 Gen-
eral Assembly resolved the ambiguity by explicitly reducing to
eighteen the age at which the custodian must turn over the
property."
93 KRS § 385.011-101 (1970).
If the gift consists of bank accounts, life insurance policies, annuity contracts, or
securities in registered form the procedure is for the donor to register the property in
the custodian's name "as custodian for [name of minor] under the Kentucky Uniform
Gifts to Minors Act," or language with similar effect. KRS § 385.021(1)(a), (d) (1975).
The custodian may be the donor himself, another adult or a trust company. KRS §
385.021(1) (a) (1975). If the securities are not in registered form, however, the statutory
requirement is that the property be delivered to the custodian (an adult other than
the donor or a trust company) accompanied by a statement of gift from the donor
containing the language of custodianship. KRS § 385.021(1)(b) (1975).
1 Splitting income provides a tax benefit to the family by virtue of the minor's
lower tax bracket and utilization of his additional personal exemption against other-
wise taxable income.
" See KRS § 385.110 (Supp. 1978).
" 1976 Ky. AcTs ch. 16, § 7 (amending KRS § 385.011(13)).
'7 Whiteside and Buechel, Kentucky Taxation, 65 Ky. L.J. 425, 433 (1976). (The
authors consider the attempt by the legislature to lower the age provided in the Uni-
form Act to be misguided.)
" KRS § 385.041(4) (Supp. 1978).
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